Abstract. Moustique is one of the sixteen finalists in the eSTREAM stream cipher project. Unlike the other finalists it is a self-synchronising cipher and therefore offers very different functional properties, compared to the other candidates. We present simple related-key phenomena in Moustique that lead to the generation of strongly correlated keystreams and to powerful key-recovery attacks. Our best key-recovery attack requires only 2 38 steps in the related-key scenario. Since the relevance of related-key properties is sometimes called into question, we also show how the described effects can help speed up exhaustive search (without related keys), thereby reducing the effective key length of Moustique from 96 bits to 90 bits.
Introduction
eSTREAM [6] is a multi-year effort to identify promising new stream ciphers. Sponsored by the ECRYPT Network of Excellence, the project began in 2004 with proposals for new stream ciphers being invited from industry and academia. These proposals were intended to satisfy either a software-oriented or a hardwareoriented profile (or both if possible). The original call for proposals generated considerable interest with 34 proposals being submitted to the two different performance profiles. Among them was Mosquito [3] , a self-synchronising stream cipher designed by Daemen and Kitsos.
As a self-synchronising stream cipher Mosquito was already a rather unusual submission. There was only one other self-synchronising stream cipher submitted, SSS [8] . Indeed it has long been recognised that the design of (secure) self-synchronising stream ciphers is a difficult task and attacks on SSS [5] and Mosquito [7] were proposed. As a result of the attack on Mosquito, a tweaked-variant of Mosquito, called Moustique [4] , was proposed for the second phase of analysis. This cipher is now one of the finalists in the eSTREAM project.
In this paper we describe a set of simple related-key pairs for Moustique.
Our observation illustrates unfortunate aspects of the tweaks in moving from
Mosquito to Moustique. They lead directly to a very strong distinguisher for the keystream generated from two related keys; and further to a rather devastating key-recovery attack in the related-key setting [2] . In fairness it should be observed that related-key phenomena are not to everyone's taste [1] . Indeed, Daemen and Kitsos state that they make no claim for the resistance of the cipher to attackers that may manipulate the key. However, we take the view that related-key weaknesses might be viewed as certificational and that the very simple partition of the keyspace according to correlated keystreams is not particularly desirable. Aside from very efficient distinguishers and key-recovery attacks in the related-key setting, the related keys also lead to an improvement over exhaustive search in a non-related-key setting.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we describe Moustique and make the observations that we need for attacks in Section 3. We then describe attacks on Moustique in the related-key setting in Section 4 and use Section 5 to describe implications on key recovery in the standard (known keystream) setting. We summarise our experimental confirmation in Section 6 and close with our conclusions. Throughout we will use established notation.
Description of Moustique
In this section we describe the parts of the Moustique description that are relevant to our observations. More information can be found in [4] . Moustique uses a key of 96 bits, denoted by k j , with 0 ≤ j ≤ 95. At each step Moustique takes as input one bit of ciphertext and produces one bit of keystream.
Moustique consists of two parts: a 128-bit conditional complementing shift register (CCSR) holding the state and a nonlinear output filter with 8 stages, see Figure 1 .
The CCSR
The CCSR is divided into 96 cells, denoted by q j with 1 ≤ j ≤ 96. Each cell contains between 1 and 16 bits, denoted by q j i . The updating function of the CCSR is given by: Table 1 . A value 0 for v or w indicates that the ciphertext feedback bit is used as input. The g x functions are defined as follows: The only difference to Mosquito is that 1/3 of Moustique state is now updated using a linear function g0 to improve diffusion within the CCSR. Table 1 . The use of the functions g0 and g1 in the CCSR.
Addition and multiplication operations are over GF(2).
The filter
The first stage of the filter compresses the 128 bits of the CCSR to 53 bits. First, the filter input a 0 = (a in the following way:
Then, the 53 bits of output are obtained by taking 53 applications of g 1 :
The next four stages of the filter iteratively transform these 53 bits in a nonlinear fashion. The sixth stage compresses the 53 bits to 12. Finally the last two stages exclusive-or these 12 bits together to produce a single bit of keystream. For simplicity, we omit the full description of the filter and refer the reader to the cipher specifications [4] . However, we note that the only non-linear filter component is the function g 1 .
Observations on Moustique
In this section we provide the basic observations that we will need in the paper. Some have already been observed in previous work [7] . This is a consequence of the fact that the IV of Moustique is used only to initialize the state, and as every self-synchronising stream cipher does, it gradually overwrites its state with ciphertext bits.
Differential trails in the filtering function
As was done in the attack on Mosquito [7] , we can make some simple observations on the filter function of Moustique. We note that the first stage of the filter is compressing and that no new information enters the filter after this stage. This leads to the first observation:
Observation 2 Any two 128-bit CCSR states that produce the same 53-bit output after the first stage of filtering also produce an equal keystream bit. Suppose we flip one of these 22 bits. The two outputs of g 1 are equal with probability p and, consequently, the two outputs of the filter will be equal with probability 0.5 + p/2. If the inputs to g 1 are balanced, then we have p = 0.5 and the probability the output bit is unchanged is 0.75 (i.e. with bias ε = 0.25).
Impact of key bits on the CCSR
The chosen ciphertext attack on Mosquito [7] exploited slow diffusion within the CCSR and so the state-update function of Mosquito was tweaked. The state update of Moustique uses a linear function g 0 for updating one third of the state bits. While this improves the worst-case diffusion, it exhibits weaknesses that we exploit to construct related-key pairs that result in highly correlated keystreams.
Moustique only uses key bits in the state-update function of the CCSR. Each of the 96 key bits is added to one of the 96 bits q j 0 . The state-update function of the CCSR introduces diffusion in one direction only: a cell with index j does not depend on cells with indices j ′ > j. An immediate consequence is that key bit k 95 affects state bit q 96 0 only. There are however more useful implications, which we introduce next. By expanding (1) and Table 1 , we obtain the following equations: This leads to a related-key pair that for any ciphertext produces CCSR states with a one-bit difference. To see this, consider two instantiations of Moustique running in decryption mode with the two keys denoted by k and k * . Assume
We use both instantiations of Moustique to decrypt the same ciphertext and observe the propagation of differences through the CCSR cells. Fig. 2 . CCSR differential propagation using related keys k = (k0, k1, k2, k3, . . . , k95) and k * = (k0, k1 + 1, k2 + 1, k3, . . . , k95).
In the first iteration of the CCSR, the differences in k 1 and k 2 will cause differences in Q , which propagates through the CCSR and the filter stages. However, after 92 iterations, this unwanted difference has been propagated out of the CCSR. We obtain a steady state behavior: at every iteration, both CCSRs differ in bit q 2 0 only. Figure 2 illustrates the propagation of the related-key differential within the CCSR.
Since Moustique has a cipher function delay of nine iterations, we can start deriving information from the keystream after nine more iterations. This will be demonstrated in the next section.
4 Related-key effects
Correlated keystreams
There are several classes of related keys for Moustique. We start with the simplest case which, coincidentally, appears to demonstrate the greatest bias. More advanced related-key pairs. We can extend the simple related keys already described. This allows us to obtain a range of related-key pairs that generate a 1-bit difference in the CCSR. Using Table 1 , the following observation is easy to verify. , we can find a set of key bits such that by flipping these key bits simultaneously and iterating the scheme, a one-bit difference between the two CCSRs is retained in a single bit position q j 0 . Among these 25 one-bit differences in the CCSR state, eight will also induce correlated keystream; these are bits q Table 2 lists the pairs of related keys that are generated along with the correlation in the associated keystream outputs. Since the correlation is extremely high, only a very small amount of keystream is required to reliably distinguish these related keystreams from a pair of random keystreams.
Furthermore, by simultaneously flipping relevant key bits for two or more indices j, we obtain a range of related keys with weaker correlation. The bias can be estimated by the Piling-Up Lemma; in the weakest case where all 8 keybit tuples are flipped, it is approximately ε = 2 −8.6 . We have verified this estimate experimentally, and we now make the following conclusion.
Observation 6 Each key of Moustique produces correlated keystream with (at least) 2 8 −1 = 255 related keys, with the bias ranging from ε = 2 −1.7 to ε = 2 −8.6 .
Key-recovery attacks
A distinguisher can often be exploited to provide a key-recovery attack, and this is also the case here. Using (6) with i = 42, (5) , and the definition of g 1 we have that a As described in Section 4.1, if we take two instantiations of Moustique and flip the key bits k 70 , k 71 , and k 72 in one instantiation, then only q 71 0 will change. This change can only propagate to the output if the bit q 43 0 equals zero. Thus, a difference in the output of two copies of Moustique running with these related keys gives us one bit of information about the CCSR state (the value q 43 = 0). Furthermore, the state bit q 43 0 only depends on the first 43 bits of the key, which leads to an efficient divide-and-conquer attack as follows.
We first observe the output of two related instances of Moustique, using some (arbitrary) ciphertext c and record the time values where the output bits differ. We then guess 43 key bits k 0 , . . . , k 42 , compute the state bit q depends on 89 key bits, of which we know already 43 − 16 = 27 bits. In addition, we found 2 31 related-key differentials that extinguish without ever reaching q 89 1 . Hence, we need to test 2 89−27−31 = 2 31 keys to determine 31 more bits. In total we have then determined 27 + 31 = 58 bits of the key and the remaining 38 bits can be determined by exhaustive search. The complexity of the attack can be estimated by 2 27 + 2 31 + 2 38 which is dominated by the third brute-force phase. We have verified the first two stages of the attack experimentally, and are indeed able to recover 58 bits of the key, given only 256 bits of keystream from two related-key pairs. Recovering the first 27 bits requires only a few minutes and 256 bits of output from a single related-key pair. 
Accelerated exhaustive key search
Next, we show how the existence of related keys in Moustique can be used in cryptanalysis even if we cannot observe the output of the cipher in a related-key setting.
In Section 4, we observed that each key has eight related keys that produce strongly correlated output. In particular, the correlation can be detected from very short keystream. Thus, we can imagine the following attack scenario: given, say, 128 bits of cipher output from a key-IV pair (k, IV ), compare this to the output of the cipher, using a candidate key k ′ , the same IV and equal ciphertext. If the outputs are not correlated, eliminate key k ′ as well as its 8 related keys. In order to compete with brute force, we need to be able to eliminate related keys efficiently. We now discuss two strategies representing different trade-offs between required keystream and computational complexity.
The strong correlation attack
In the first approach we use the (7, 4) Hamming code. As Hamming codes are perfect, we know that for each 7-bit string s, there exists a codeword c i such that the Hamming distance between s and c i is at most one. The codewords of the (7, 4) Hamming code are listed in Table 3 . Now, for each codeword c i , we fix candidate key bits k 1 , k 4 , k 7 , k 10 , k 13 , k 16 , k 70 to this codeword, and exhaustively search over the remaining 89 key bits. This strategy guarantees that we test either the correct key or one of the closely related keys given in Table 2 . A related key can then be easily detected from the strong correlation of the two keystreams. For example, assume that the correct subkey is (k 1 , k 4 , k 7 , k 10 , k 13 , k 16 , k 70 ) and the closest codeword is (k 1 , k 4 + 1, k 7 , k 10 , k 13 , k 16 , k 70 ). Then, according to Table 2 ,
. . , k 95 ) is a related key that has been selected for testing.
Our experiments suggest that 128 keystream bits are sufficient to detect correlation between the correct key k and a related candidate key k * (see Sect. 6 for experimental results). Given that IV setup takes 105 cipher clocks, the total worst-case complexity of our attack is (105+128)·2 4 ·2 89 ≈ 2 100.9 cipher clocks. In comparison, naive brute force requires on average 2 keystream bits to eliminate false candidates, so the complexity is (105 + 2) · 2 96 = 2 102.7 cipher clocks.
The piling-up attack
Following Observation 6, we partition the keys into 2 88 sets of 2 8 related keys and test only one key in each set. After 105 clocks of IV setup, the states corresponding to two related keys differ in at most 8 bits (given in Table 2 
then none of these 8 bits influences a 1 , the output of the first filter stage, and hence the keystream bits generated by two related keys are equal. Consequently, if, while testing a key k ′ we observe that the bit of keystream generated by k ′ differs from the bit of the observed keystream at a time when the candidate state satisfies (7), then we are sure that the key k we are looking for is not a related key of k ′ and we can discard k ′ as well as its 2 8 − 1 related keys.
To estimate the amount of keystream needed to eliminate wrong keys, we note that two unrelated keystreams overlap with probability 1 2 , so we can use half of the available keystream to test for condition (7) . As Pr[a , while the remaining bits in (7) are balanced, condition (7) is true with probability p = Both our strategies for accelerated exhaustive key search are rather simple and just as easily parallelisable as exhaustive search, so they are likely to provide an advantage over simple brute force in practice. The piling-up attack is an estimated 50 times faster than exhaustive key search, indicating that the effective key length of Moustique is reduced to 90 bits instead of the claimed 96-bit security.
Experimental verification
The results in this paper were verified using the source code for Moustique that was submitted to eSTREAM [6] . All sets of key bits identified in Table 2 were tested with one thousand random keys and their related partners. The minimum, maximum, and average number of agreements between the two generated keystreams, over the first 128 bits, was recorded. Note that for un-correlated keystreams we would expect 64 matches. We then constructed a distinguisher by setting the agreement threshold to t ≥ 74. We chose randomly 10 000 related-key pairs, all of which passed the test, indicating that the false negative rate is below 0.01%. In comparison, out of 10 000 128-bit keystreams obtained from random key pairs, 440 passed the test, so the false positive rate was below 5%. Thus, we can use our accelerated key search to eliminate 95% of the keys, and then brute-force the remaining candidates. The total complexity of the attack is still below that of naive exhaustive search, and the success rate is at least 99.99%.
Conclusions
In moving from Mosquito, it seems that the design of the self-synchronizing stream cipher Moustique was established in a rather ad hoc way. While the tweaked design resists the chosen-ciphertext attack on Mosquito, we showed that it still exhibits weaknesses that lead to strong distinguishers in the relatedkey setting. Further, we presented two different strategies for exploiting those distinguishers in a key-recovery attack. The first strategy allows the attacker to recover the 96-bit secret key in 2 69 steps, assuming that the attacker is able to observe the output of two instances of the cipher using the secret key and a related key. The complexity of this attack can be reduced to 2 38 steps if the attacker is able to observe the output of three instances of the cipher using the secret key and two related keys. Both require a negligible amount of ciphertext, e.g. less than 256 bits.
We have also exploited the observations we made in a non-related-key attack. Our first attack breaks the cipher in around 2 101 steps, using only 128 bits of known plaintext. If furthermore a few thousand keystream bits are known, the complexity is reduced to 2 97 steps. In comparison, exhaustive search would take 2 103 equivalent steps, indicating that Moustique falls about 6 bits short of the claimed 96-bit security. While, admittedly, a 2 97 attack is still far from being practical, it illustrates the relevance of related-key weaknesses in the standard (non-related-key) setting.
